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THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR AN AIRPORT NOISE-COMPATIBILITY
LAND USE PROGRAM

The growth of aviation in recent years has led to widespread
concern about the impact of airport noise upon surrounding communities.1 The scope of the problem is affected by the number and
type of aircraft using an airport, the manner in which they are
operated, and the use made of adjacent land. 2 There is basic
agreement on the necessity of a multipronged attack 3 which employs source noise reduction,4 operational techniques, 5 and com-

' Aviation-generated noise affects not only the six to seven million Americans living near
airports, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY], but also the airport
proprietors who bear legal responsibility for the adverse impact of noise, Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), see note 26 infra, the federal, state and local governments, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra at 29-34, and the National Aviation
System as envisioned by the FAA, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, THE NATIONAL
AVIATION SYSTEM: CHALLENGES OF THE DECADE AHEAD 1977-1986, at 7 (1976). See
generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORT NOISE AND APPORTIONMENT OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS].
2
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
FIVE-YEAR ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN 1976-1980, at 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FIVE-YEAR
PLAN]; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, THE NATIONAL AVIATION SYSTEM: CHALLENGES OF THE DECADE AHEAD 1977-1986, supra note 1, at 23; Comment, Port Noise
Complaint, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REY. 61, 76 (1970).
3
Comment, Port Noise Complaint, supra note 2, at 74-83; FIVE-YEAR PLAN, supra note
2, at 13-15.
• Source noise reduction refers to alterations in aircraft engines which diminish the
amount of noise generated by the engines. FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 2, at 15-16;
Comment, Port Noise Complaint, supra note 2, at 76-77; AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT
POLICY, supra note 1, at 6-8; Dworkin, Planning for Airports in Urban Environments: A
Survey of the Problem and Its Possible Solutions, 5 URB. LAW. 472, 479-80 (1973).
Public Law 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968), amended§ 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), so as to require aircraft noise abatement
regulations. In accordance with this legislation, Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,
14 C.F.R. 36 (1976), was promulgated to prescribe noise standards for new, subsonic
transport aircraft and all subsonic turbojet aircraft. As part of the federal program outlined in
AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note 1, older aircraft will be required to meet
Part 36 standards within 6 to 8 years. Id. at 35-42. The FAA is presently considering new,
lower noise standards for future generation aircraft. Id. at 43.
5
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC91-39 (Jan. 18, 1974).
Operational techniques for reducing noise impact include changes in takeoff procedures
(including power reductions, turns during takeoff, and reduced rates of climb), approach
procedures (including a two-segment glide path), preferential runways, and staggered operations. See U.S. DEP T OF TRANSPORTATION, AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT: A
GUIDE TO _ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 131-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as AIRPORTS AND
THEIR ENVIRONMENT],
0
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prehensive land use management6 to control noise impact. There is
less consensus, however, with respect to the implementation of
these strategies. 7
Discussions of noise abatement proposals have concentrated
upon source noise reduction and operational adjustments. 8 Land
use management, however, is also necessary to achieve noisecompatible development around airports and removal or modification of existing incompatible uses. 9 Noise-compatibility land use
planning involves five techniques for controlling development: 10
property acquisition, 11 property regulation, 12 building and housing
codes, 13 tax policies, 14 and negotiation between public agencies
over proposed developments. 15

6
AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note I, at 10; FIVE-YEAR PLAN, supra
note 2, at 23-25; Dworkin, supra note 4, at 480-82; Comment, Port Noise Complaint, supra
note 2, at 81-83.
The Airports and Airways Development Act of 1970, § 18(4), Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219 (1970), conditions federal airport development assistance upon land use management to
promote compatible development.
7
Recently, both the FAA and the EPA have offered competing national programs designed to coordinate a single national airport noise policy. The FAA proposal required the
retrofit (soundproofing) or replacement of existing subsonic jets that exceed specified noise
levels. AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note I, at 5-11. In addition, airport
proprietors will be encouraged to develop noise abatement programs, including land use
measures, with federal assistance. In contrast, the EPA plan requires airport proprietors to
develop a noise abatement program for the protection of the health and welfare of the
surrounding community. EPA Airport Noise Regulatory Process, 41 Fed. Reg. 51, 522-33
(proposed regulations submitted to the FAA by the EPA, Nov. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Airport Noise Regulatory Process).
8 See Comment, Port Noise Complaint, supra note 2; Note, The Constitutional Aspects of
the Airport Noise Problem in Georgia, 10 GA. L. REv. 218, 234-38 (1975). See generally City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Air Transport Ass'n ot
America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); National Aviation v. City of Hayward,
No. C-75-2279 H.F.P. (N.D. Cal., July 13, 1976).
9
Seago, The Airport Noise Problem and Airport Zoning, 28 MD. L. REV. 120 (1968).
lO AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 168-80.
11
Property acquisition may take the form of eminent domain proceedings, purchase of
title in fee, purchase of noise easements, or land acquisition in anticipation of airport
development. Id. at 169-74.
12
Property regulation consists primarily of z.cming, but may also include the requirement
of a written statement to a prospective purchaser regarding the impact of noise on the
property. Id. at 174-79.
13
Building and housing codes may contain provisions for soundproofing and performance
specifications. Id. at 179. For a full discussion of the constitutionality of mandatory soundproofing regulations, see Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton, Legal Aspects of Required
Soundproofing In High Noise Areas Near John F. Kennedy International Airport (unpublished report prepared for the Tri-State Transportation Commission, Feb. 2, 1970) (concluding that soundproofing regulations, as an exercise of the police power, will be more likely to
withstand a constitutional challenge if limited to multiple-unit residential development).
14
Preferential taxation to attract compatible development, to encourage soundproofing,
or to provide compensation for noise impact are additional elements of an airport land use
program. AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 180.
15 Negotiation between public agencies as to proposed developments is nece~sary to
coordinate the various levels of gove.mment involved in airport land use. Id. at 180-81. See
also Gottleib, Land Use Controls for Airport Planning, 3 URB. LAW. 266 (1971); Blitch,
Airport Noise and Intergovernmental Conflict: A Case Study in Land Use Parochialism, 5
EcoL. L.Q. 669 (1976).
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This article will assess the constitutionality of zoning to promote
noise-compatible development and the problems of establishing an
institutional framework for such land use management. 16 Particular
attention will be paid to the location of authority to administer a
noise-compatibility program and to procedures for enforcing the
program's goals.

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AIRPORT
NOISE-COMPATIBILITY ZONING

Zoning for noise-compatible development around airports
should be a central feature of an airport land use program. 17 It
primarily serves a preventive function, since it is difficult to eliminate nonconforming uses which exist at the time a zoning ordinance is enacted. 18 It may preserve existing compatible land uses
and may prevent change to incompatible uses. Additionally, effective noise-compatibility zoning may lead to the development of
compatible uses in areas where noncompatible uses have not yet
been established. 19
Public regulation of private property is limited by the fifth
amendment, which provides that "private property shall not be
taken for public use, without just compensation. " 20 Through the

16
The purpose of discussing the institutional framework is to assess alternative institutions for land use management, not their specific goals or criteria. For a similar approach,
see LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYLSIS, supra note I, at 3-1.
17
AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note I, at 51. Gottleib, supra note 15, at
269.
18
Retroactive zoning to eliminate nonconforming uses is not favored by the courts. A
wning ordinance which prohibits an existing use will be sustained where the consequent
loss to the owner is "relatively slight and insubstantial," but otheiwise the owner is entitled
to compensation for a "taking." I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 6.06 (2d ed.
1976), citing People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952). See also Standard Oil Co.
v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d %0, 86 A.L.R. 648 (1932); State ex rel.
Nealy v. Cole, 442 S. W.2d 128 (Mo. App. 1969); City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895,
39 N.W.2d 828 (1949), appeal dismissed sub nom., Glissman v. City of Omaha, 339 U.S. 960
(1950), reh. denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950); State v. Joyner, 23 N.C. App. 27, 208 S.E.2d 233
(1974), afj'd, 286 N.C. 366,211 S.E.2d 320 (1975), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975);
State ex rel. Fairmont Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777, 136 A.L.R.
840 (1941).
19
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AIRCRAFT NOISE IMPACT:
PLANNING GUIDELINES FOR LOCAL AGENCIES 109 (1972) [hereinafter cited as AIRCRAFT
NOISE IMPACT].
• 0 U.S. CONST. amend. V. About one-half of the state constitutions contain clauses
identical to the "taking" clause of the fifth amendment. The remaining states prohibit the
"taking or damaging of private property. without just compensation." Spat er, Noise and the
Law, 63 M1cH. L. REv. 1373, 1399(1965). See, e.g., CALIF. CONST. art. I.§ 14. A California
court, applying the "taking or damaging" clause of the state constitution in an inverse
condemnation case arising out of excessive noise generated by an airport, held that the
additional language extended the scope of compensable injury beyond the limits of the
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power of eminent domain, public authorities may take property for
public use without the owner's consent, 21 if the owner is compensated. 22 When property has been appropriated for public use without compensation, the property owner may bring an inverse condemnation claim against the government for the value of the property "taken. " 23 The point at which regulatory action becomes a
"taking" is unclear. 24
With few exceptions, major airports are owned by governmental
entities. 25 In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 26 the Supreme Court
held that a public airport proprietor is responsible for the "taking"
of property resulting from the noise of direct 27 aircraft overflights
of plaintiff's residence. The excessive noise caused a reduction in

United States Constitution. Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 162 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974). Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), similarly interpreted an analogous provision in the
Washington Constitution. However, Spater criticizes Martin, and impliedly Aaron, for
reaching an overly broad conclusion:
Did the court in Martin literally mean that "[w]hen the land of an individual is
·diminished in value for the public benefit, then justice, and the constitution require
that the public pay?'' If that is the intent, damages may be recovered in Washington
for enacting building restrictions or zoning requirements, for converting a two-way
street into a one-way street, for narrowing sidewalks, for constructing neighborhood fire or police stations, or even for erecting a new lamppost, as well as for the
noise of highways, railways and airways.
·
Spater, supra, at 1405-06.
While the scope of compensation may be broader under such provisions, the meaning of
"taking" is not clearer. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax II]; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,
1171 (1967); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1971).
21
1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§ 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1976).
22
See note 20 supra.
23
See, e.g., Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309,310,391 P.2d 540,542 (1964),cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). See generally Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-called Inverse or Reverse
Condemnation, 1968 URB. L. ANN. 1; Van Alstyne, supra note 20.
24
Van Alstyne, supra note 17, at 1-3. See generally Michelman,. supra note 20; Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax I]; Sax II,
supra note 20; F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
25
Airport Noise Regulatory Process, supra note 7, at 51,523. Hollywood-Burbank Airport in California is one of only three or four important exceptions. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2-46 .
26
•
369 U.S. 84 (1962). In Griggs, noise and vibration caused by extremely low overflights
of planes leaving and arriving at defendant's airport interfered with the use and enjoyment of
the plaintiff's residence. The court held that there was a taking of an air easement which
must be compensated for and that the "promoter, owner, and lessor" of the airport was the
"taker" who must pay the compensation. 369 U.S. at 89-90.
27
The federal courts have continued to require direct physical overflight of plaintiff's
property before awarding compensation, see Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.
1962), but the rule has eroded in states with similar property clauses. Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). States in which the constitution provides for
compensation where property.is "taken or damaged," see note 20 supra, however, have
granted compensation independent of the direct physical overflight requirement. Martin v.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974).
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property value which, in the Court's view, required the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Land use controls, which restrict
development around airports to uses that are compatible with high
levels of noise, may eliminate the need to purchase the impacted
land. Therefore, airport noise-compatibility zoning may be constitutionally suspect. 28
A. Airport Hazard Zoning
While several tests of the "taking" issue have been suggested by
commentators, 29 this note is concerned only with four. 30 The first
test is whether the government, in the course of regulation, de.:
stroyed the property right under consideration. If, instead, the
right was conferred upon the public for public use, compensation
must be made to the injured property owner. 31 Thus, this test
posits a qualitative difference between regulation and "taking. " 32
A second test asks whether the owners of the regulated property
received reciprocal benefits and were therefore compensated to
some extent for their losses. 33 Another procedure for distinguishing the po.int at which regulation becomes a "taking" is to focus
upon the rolt;: of the government. If the public agency is arbitrating

28
See Part I B infra. Typical claimants for compensation in an inverse condemnation suit
occasioned by airport noise-compatibility zoning are owners of property previously zoned
"residential," who are prevented from developing the property. Owners of land that is
already zoned and developed, who have suffered a market value loss due to the imposition
of land use controls, may also be plaintiffs in an inverse condemnation proceeding. An
additional injured party may be a local governmental authority, if land use controls cause a
loss of tax revenue. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY TO
AMELIO RA TE THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 52 (1975) [hereinafter ·
cited as a A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY].
29
See Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REv.
1, 12 n.30 (1972).
30
This note will not discuss the most widely used test; diminution of value. The classic
formulation of this test was given by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413,415 (1922). Diminution of value, however, is not unique to airport
zoning, but is a feature of all regulation. The special constitutional difficulties of airport
hazard zoning, see Part I A infra, indicate that airport noise-compatibility zoning will be
challenged as to its purposes and benefits, not its extent. Additionally, "denial of all
reasonable use" is not an appropriate test of airport noise-compatibility zoning in general.
Such zoning allows a variety of uses which, while less profitable than incompatible uses
might be, are viable enterprises. See generally Kusler, supra note 29, at 35-41.
31
See Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). .
32
This conception of the "taking"issue finds expression in the opinions of the first Mr.
Justice Harlan. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Se~ also Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S 393, 416-22 (1922). For thorough
discussions of this test, see F. BoSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 24, at
118-23, and Sax I, supra note 24, at 38-40.
33
See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970), where the court held that the
landowners' "compensation by sharing in the benefits which this restriction [conservation
measure to protect the ecology of coastal wetlands] is intended to secure is so dispropor•
tionate to their deprivation of reasonable use that such exercise of the State's police power is
unreasonable."
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between competing private claims, and not acquiring benefits for
itself, the action is within the police power. 34 Conversely, if the
regulatory action benefits the government in its role as proprietor
of an economic enterprise, it is a "taking" which requires compensation.35 A final test is whether the effects of the competing uses
"spill over" onto each other. If so, then neither is entitled a priori
to prevail on constitutional grounds, and the legislature is the
appropriate decision-making body. 36
The judicial experience with airport hazard zoning illustrates the
constitutional questions which arise with noise-compatibility zoning. While courts have generally accepted comprehensive community zoning since the landmark decision of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty, 37 airport hazard zoning has often been invalidated
on constitutional grounds. 38 Airport hazard zoning acts have normally been enacted for the purpose of protecting both aircraft users
and the community from certain hazards of aircraft operations,

34
See Sax I, supra note 24, at 63. "But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government ·acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a noncompensable exercise of the police power."
35
Id. at 63. "The rule here proposed is that when economic loss is incurred as a result of
government enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking."
36 See Sax II, supra note 20, at 155- 72. This analysis is intended to
... put competing resource-users in a position of equality when each of them seeks
to make a use that involves some imposition (spillover) on his neighbors, and those
demands are in conflict. In such cases, and such cases only, there is a conflic"t in
which neither is a priori entitled to prevail, because neither claimant ha5 any more
right to impose on his neighbor than his neighbor does on him. Only in such
situations may one use be curtailed by the government without triggering the taking
clause.
Id. at 161.
37
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
38 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.36 (1968). Airport hazard zoning
cases in which the court invalidated the zoning are Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161
Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958); Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d
845, n Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal, App. 2d 205, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1963); Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. Rep. 1 (Sup. Ct., Mendocino
Co., Cal. 1948); Roark v. Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964); Indiana Toll Road
Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 487
(1965); Banks v. Fayette County Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1958); Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. Ct. App.
1.968), cert. denied, 393 U.S .. 1088 (1969); Mutual Chem. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, I Av. Cas. 804 (Cir. Ct. Bait. City, Md. 1939); Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v.
Evans, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966); Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L.
370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945); Hageman v. Wayne Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251
N.E.2d 507 (1969). Contra, Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 160 So. 2d 6
(1963); Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967);
Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 243 Cal. App. 2d 126, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1966); Harrell's
Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959); Waring
v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); LaSalle Nat'I Bank v. County of
Cook, 34 Ill. App. 3d 264, 340 N .E.2d 79 ( 1975); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29
Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972), cert. denied, sub nom., Chrongris v. Corrigan, 409
U.S. 919(1972); Township of Hickory v. Chadderton,43 Pa. D. &C. 2d319, IO Av. Cas. 17,
410 (C.P., Mercer Co. 1967).
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particularly low-flying aircraft. 39 In contrast to standard "Euclidean" zoning, airport hazard zoning moves the inoffensive uses
(residences) away from the offensive uses (airports). Such acts
establish height limits and specify permissible land uses based
upon a consideration of runway configuration, approach and
takeoff paths, the type of aircraft using the airport, and the type of
aircraft navigation assistance. 4 ° For example, the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR) 41 specify the allowable structure heights and
the definition of use zones. While the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no authority to enforce height regulations, it may
curtail use of a runway if structure height violates the FAR standards. Consequently, height regulation almost uniformly follows
FAA recommendations. 42
Judicial hostility to airport hazard zoning may be traced to the
fact that the benefits are conferred upon a public agency operating
the airport, without compensation to the affected property owner.
In this situation, the government is acquiring resources in its capacity as proprietor of an economic enterprise-the airport. 43 The
implementation of such zoning eliminates the need to alter flight
patterns in order to accommodate structures, 44 and prevents the
obstruction of radar and other navigational aids. 45 Since height
limitations and the removal of obstructions are necessary for airport operations, zoning ordinances with these objectives may substitute for the purchase of flight easements by the public agency
operating the airport. 46 Accordingly, the majority of courts which
have considered the constitutionality of airport hazard zoning have
ruled that it is an impermissible taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. 47
In Hageman v. Board of Trustees, 48 for example, the owners of

39 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, MODEL AIRPORT HAZARD ZoNING ORDINANCE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 150/5190-3A (1972). See Village of
Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N .E.2d 658 (1972) for a discussion of
chapter 4563, Revised Code of Ohio.
4 o AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 178-79.
41 Federal Aviation Regulations F.A.R. Part 77, at 14 C.F.R. § 77 (1976).
42 AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 178-79.
43
See Sax I, supra note 24, at 62.
44
Id. at 177-79.
45 Id. Also, FAA regulations require that airports provide a clear approach path in order
to receive funds under the Federal-aid Airport Program. Federal Aviation Regulations
F.A.R. Parts 151.7(d), 151.9, 151.11, at 14C.F.R. § 151 (1976).See, in particular,§ 151.ll(f).
These restrictions apply to the vast majority of major American airports. Between 1971
and 1975, federal funding supported 2,434 projects at 1,225 airports. H.R. REP. No. 94-594,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
46 See Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370,373.40 A.2d 559,561
(1945): "The city may not under the guise of an ordinance acquire rights in private property
which it may only acquire by purchase or by the exercise of its power of eminent domain.''
47
See cases cited in note 30 supra.
48
20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251 N.E_.2d ~07 (1969).'
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property designated by the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Joint
Airport Zoning Board as part of an Air Hazard Corridor sought a
declaration that the zoning regulations adopted by the Board were
unconstitutional as a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. 49 The challenged regulations limited
density of development to two residences per acre, and also restricted the height of structures. 50 Although the defendants argued
that the regulations were a justified exercise of the police power, 51
the court held that the owners of the land could not be required to
bear the costs of insuring the safety of the persons using the Air
Force Base for public purposes. Therefore, the land use controls
constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 52
In Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 53 the Airport
Authority filed suit to require the removal or topping of fifteen
trees which had grown into the instrument approach zone. 54 In
violation of an ordinance adopted under authority of the Airport
Zoning Act, 55 the trees had reached a height of more than fifty feet.
The court, relying upon the distinction between police power regulation and "taking or damaging" set forth in Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle, 56 held that the ordinance so restricted the rights of the
property owner as to constitute a taking for public use without just
compensation. 5 7
In Ackerman, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished between the two concepts, stating that police power rules are usually
applied if "private property rights are actually destroyed through
governmental action," but that eminent domain proceedings are
required ''when private property rights are taken from the individual and are conferred upon the public for public use. " 58 The

49

ld. at 20, 251 N.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 15, 251 N.E.2d at 510.
The defendants argued that "the regulations were enacted for the safety of the people
who live there and who would be living there but for the regulations, and for the safety of the
persons and property of those who land and takeoff at the base." Id. at 15, 251 N .E.2d at
510.
52
/d. at 20, 251 N.E.2d at 512. See also Mutual Chem. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, I Av. Cas. 804, 807 (Cir. Ct. Bait. City, Md. 1939); LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 2-54.
53
191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966).
54
/d. at 127.
55
/d. See Miss. CODE ANN. 1942 §§ 7544-01-17 (recompiled 1956).
56 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664, 77 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1960).
57
191 So. 2d at 133.
58 Wash. 2d at 408, 348 P.2d at 669. The underpinning for this distinction may be found
in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), where the first Mr. Justice Harlan noted "[t]he
exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance,
or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is
very different from taking property for public use .... "Id. at 699. As Sax I, supra note 24,
at 39, observes, the Harlan theory distinguishes a qualitative difference between the police
power and a "taking."
50
51
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plaintiffs in Ackerman alleged that the Port of Seattle, as operator
of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, used the airspace
above their property as an airway for takeoffs and landings, substantially reducing the value of the land. 59 Since the Port had failed
to acquire the property through eminent domain proceedings, the
plaintiffs maintained that it was violating the provisions of the
Washington Constitution prohibiting the taking of private property
without compensation. 60 In holding that the frequent low flights
amounted to the taking of a flight easement for which compensation was required, the court found that the rights of the property
had been conferred upon the public for public use. 61 While Ackerman involved only an alleged "taking" due to repeated aircraft
overflights of plaintiff's property, it has been cited with approval in
a number of cases holding that airport hazard zoning amounts to a
taking of private property. 62
A leading case upholding the constitutionality of airport hazard
zoning is Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority. 63 The Airport Authority filed suit to enjoin the
erection of an ornamental roof on defendant's building in excess
of the height limits established by the local airport zoning ordinance. 64 The defendants asserted that the enabling statute authorizing the local ordinance was unconstitutional because it authorized an unlawful taking of property without just compensation. 65 In sustaining the constitutionality of the enabling statute,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the regulations were presumptively valid. In order to successfully ·attack the land use controls,
the defendants had to "carry the extraordinary burden of both
alleging and proving that it [the land use regulation] is unreasonable
and bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, mor-

59

Id. at 403, 348 P.2d at 666.
Id. at 403-04, 348 P.2d at 666.
"' Id. at 408-12, 348 P.2d at 669-71.
62
See Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 210-11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318,
321-22 (1963); Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 561-62, 394 P.2d 641, 643 (1964);
Hageman v. Board of Trustees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 16-17, 251 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1969);
Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126, 131-32 (Miss. 1966).
Airport hazard zoning ordinances have also been invalidated on the ground that the
particular application of wning controls was arbitrary and unreasonable. See Kissinger v.
City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958). In Kissinger, the evidence
established that no change in the character of the property or surrounding neighborhood had
occurred since the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan that placed the property in a
residential classification. Moreover, the city had not attempted to rezone any other property
within the flight plan of the airport, and had permitted multiple residence dwellings and two
public schools to be erected within the flight plan. Id. at 460-61, 327 P.2d at 15. The rezoning
of plaintiff's property was invalidated as an arbitrary action. Id. at 462-63, 327 P.2d at 16-17.
See also Banks v. Fayette County Bd., 313 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).
63
111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
64
Id. at 440.
65 /d. at·44J.
•
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als or general welfare. " 66 Unlike the courts in Hageman and
Jackson, the court did not discuss the public ownership of the
airport as a factor affecting the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Similarly, in LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 67 the
court held that height limitations in the vicinity of airports adopted
as part of a Cook County zoning ordinance did not work an unconstitutional taking of private property. 68 The disputed height limitations were more restrictve than those established by FAA regulations. 69 The court found that the ordinance was enacted for a valid
police power purpose and that it did not have the effect of appropriating private property for public use. 70 Implicit in this finding was
a determination that the restrictions were reasonably required to
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. 71 The effect
of public ownership of the airport upon the question of "taking" by
property regulation was not discussed. 72 In cases where the issue
was involved, airport hazard zoning has been invalidated. 73
B. Airport Zoning to Promote
Noncompatible Development

Airport noise-compatibility zoning is designed to locate near
airports those land uses which are not adversely affected by noise
impact, 74 including light industrial uses which are inherently noisy,
such as machine shops, and uses involving few people, such as
reservoirs and sewage treatment plants :75 Airport service activities, like warehouses and transportation facilities, are also
noise-compatible uses. Finally, hotels, office buildings, alld other
indoor uses may be soundproofed in order to minimize noise im-

66
Id. at 443. In discussing the Harrell's decision, the Environmental Protection Agency
argues that the rationale for the holding derives from Euclid: zoning is a valid exercise of the
police power of the State unless it is clearly arbitrary. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANAL YSIS, supra note I, at 2-52. Harrell's was followed in a Florida case, Waring v. Peterson, 137
So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
67
34 Ill. App. 3d 264, 340 N .E.2d 79 (1975).
68 Id. at 277-78, 340 N .E.2d at 89.
69 Id. at 272-74, 340 N.E.2d at 86-87.
10 Id. at 278, 340 N.E.2d at 89.
11 Id. at 277, 340 N .E.2d at 89.
72 The court noted only that the operation of the airport by the federal government, which
caused aircraft overflights of the plaintiff's property, was not at issue in the case. Id. at
277-78, 340 N.E.2d at 89.
13 See text accompanying notes 39-53 supra.
14 See AIRCRAFT NOISE IMPACT, supra note 19, at '109-10. See generally NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, A STUDY OF THE OPTIMUM USE OF LAND
EXPOSED TO AIRCRAFT LANDING AND TAKE OFF NOISE 68-102 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
NASA].
75 NASA, supra note 74, at 103. See generally AIRCRAFT NoISE IMPACT, supra note 19.
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pact. 76 If the noise reduction is sufficient, these uses may be
compatible with airport noise. 77
As in airport hazard zoning, the "taking" issue may arise because the airport is owned and operated by a governmental entity. 78 Two California cases have been cited for the proposition that
airport noise zoning is constitutionally valid, 79 but this reliance
appears to be misplaced. In Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 80
the court upheld a rezoning of property near Santa Maria Airport
from Residential to Design Industrial. The stated reason for the
rezoning was that private citizens residing near the airport would
b so annoyed by airport operations that they would suffer compensable damages. The court stated, in dictum, that such a reason
justified the passage of the zoning ordinance. 81 In attacking the
lower court dismissal of their inverse condemnation suit, the property owners argued that the rezoning was unreasonable, oppressive, and discriminatory. The Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal, noting that the plaintiffs failed to allege a diminution of
value due to the rezoning. 82 The court neither considered the
constitutionality of noise-compatibility zoning, nor confronted the
problem of government ownership of Santa Maria Airport .
. In Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo. 83 the plaintiffs alleged
that they purchased their property near Paso Robles Airport in
reliance upon a zoning ordinance which stated that the land would
be ,rezoned for subdivision upon request. Instead, the County
Board of Supervisors rezoned the land in order to decrease the
allowable density of land use. 84 The court dismissed an argument
that the property regulation resulted in a taking without compensation. It noted that the plaintiffs had not pleaded any activity from
which a "taking" might be implied. In the absence of such a
16 NASA, supra note 74, at 68-102. See also Figure 2-15, Land Use Compatibility
Guidelines for Aircraft Noise Environments, in AIRCRAFT NOISE IMPACT, supra note 19, at
54.
11
See NASA, supra note 65, at 68-71.
18 ·See text accompanying note 25 supra.
79 Blitch, supra note 15, at 698-99.
so 243 Cal. App. 2d 126, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1966).
81
Id. at 130. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
82 Id. at 130, 131-32, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 293, 295. The property owners
conced[ed] the accepted principle that if the facts upon which a zoning ordinance is
predicated are fairly debatable, courts will not disturb a legislative determination.
They contend. however, that such legislative determination may not be unreasonable. oppressive or discriminatory, and that the admitted facts at bench show that
the zoning ordinance here involved all three.
Id. at 130. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs. as appellants, relied upon
Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d IO (1958), in support of thi's
proposition. In distinguishing the two cases, the Smith court noted that Kissinger involved
an instance of "spot zoning." 243 Cal. App. 2d at 129, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 294. See note 62
supra.
83
247 Cal. App. 2d 600. 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967) .
84
.
Id. at 601-02. 55 Cal. Rptr. at 7 I I.
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showing, the court felt entitled to presume that the rezoning was a
reasonable exercise of the police power designed to ''forestall the
development of residential zones in areas susceptible to excessive
noise or above-average hazard. " 85 The Morse court did, however,
distinguish the challenged ordinance from an airport zoning ordinance limiting building height on the ground that the former did not
appropriate the use of airspace above the plaintiff's property. 86 As
in Smith, though, the problem of government ownership and operation of the airport was not addressed.
As with airport hazard zoning, noise-compatibility controls
would benefit the users and proprietors of the airport by eliminating any need to purchase the impacted property, 87 and by removing
the need for high-risk aircraft operational techniques to reduce
noise impact. 88 Noise-compatibility zoning, however, may be distinguished from hazard zoning on the ground that it may benefit a
larger class of people. High levels of noise may have a widespread
impact upon property values in a community. 89 Aircraft noise
adversely affects the use and enjoyment of property, thereby impairing its market value. 90 Since a difference in housing costs
provides an economic incentive for persons to move into an area,
the decrease in property values may even result in noise-induced
ghettos in communities adjacent to airports which will be populated by residents who, for economic reasons, have a limited
choice of housing. 91 Noise-compatibility zoning regulations de-

Id. at 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
Id. at 604, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 713, distinguishing Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal.
App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
In summary, the court held that "[s]o far as the pleadings disclose, the reclassification
neither resulted in the use of plaintiffs' airspace for public purposes nor did it take away
plaintiffs' right to continue the existing use of the property." 247 Cal. App. 2d at 604, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 713.
87
Since airport noise zoning would avoid the necessity of purchasing noise-impacted
property. the costs of aviation activities would not reflect the costs of buying the land.
Instead, the costs would be borne by the individual landowners. See Hageman v. Board of
Trustees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251 N .E.2d 507 (1969), where the court explicitly held that the
burden of insuring the safety of aviation consumers could not constitutionally be placed
upon the landowner. See generally Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regulate-ls That the
Question? Reflections On the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and
Private Property Rights, 8 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 253 (1975).
88 Modification of operational techniques in order to reduce noise-impact often entails a
higher risk factor than did the original technique. AVIATION NoISE ABATEMENT PoucY,
supra note 1, at 45. See also AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, Table 18, at
135-38.
89 Proximity to the airport is not the sole determinant of noise impact. The direction of
flight paths, the type of aircraft using the facility, the flight profiles, the local weather
conditions, and the type of community development are all important factors. See Alekshun,
Aircraft Noise Law: A Technical Perspective, 55 A.B.A.J. 740 (1969).
90 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE EFFECTS OF MOBILE-SOURCE AIR AND NOISE
POLLUTION ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 8-12 to 8-16 (1975).
91 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, LAND USE CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR AIRPORT IMPACTED AREAS 11-12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAND UsE CONTROL STRATEGIES].
85

86
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signed to prevent the development of such noise ghettos benefit the
present and future 92 residents and users of the community by
stabilizing property values 93 and protecting public health and
safety. 94 In sum, unlike airport hazard zoning which benefits only
the users and proprietors of the airport, noise compatibility zoning
ben~fits the residents and users of communities surrounding the
airport, as well as the users and proprietors. 95 This conclusion is
significant for two reasons. Both the "noise-generating" airport
and the "silence-demanding" residences impose spillover effects
on each other. 96 It may be argued that, where two uses spill over
on each other, neither has a constitutional right to prevail. 97 The
determination as to which use will prevail should be left to the
legislature for resolution. 98 Rationally, this determination will be
made by comparing the relative costs and benefits of each solution.99 Alternatively, the additional benefits of noise-compatibility
zoning may be conclusive in the judicial forum, as evidence of
sufficient reciprocal benefits to validate the legislation. 100
A second distinction between the two forms of zoning is that
noise-compatibility zoning does not appropriate the regulated property to the benefit of the public agency operating the airport. 101
92
Benefits to future residents are a valid police power objective. Barkmann v. Town of
Hempstead. 49 N.Y.S.2d 262. 268 App. Div. 785 (1944), affd, 294 N.Y. 805. 62 N.E.2d 238
(1945); H.F.H .• Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508,523,542 P.2d 237,248,125 Cal. Rptr.
365, 376 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
93
CJ. Blades v. Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1952) (police power permits
property restrictions which promote the general welfare by conserving the value of other
properties); Schloss v. Jamison, 262 N.C. 108, I 16, 136 S.E.2d 691, 697 (1964) (zoning
ordina,nce sustained under enabling act which authorized regulation assuring "the greatest
possible use and enjoyment of land ... , balanced against the necessary protection of the
values of buildings and land and the use and enjoyment of land on adjacent properties .
. . . ").
94
Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 603, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712
(1%7). Cf. I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2d § 3. IO (1968) (public healJh and
safety as valid police power objectives). The extent of harm to property may also be offset
by coupling partial compensation to the imposition of noise-compatibility zoning. See A
COMPREHENSIVE Poucy, supra note 28, at 25-26, 32-33. For example, tax concessions for
compatible development may be offered to owners of property regulated by the compatibility controls. See NASA, supra note 74, at 49-51, discussing tax abatement to attract
airport-compatible development.
95
Since FAA regulations require a clear approach path at all airports receiving federal
funds, see note 45 supra, height limits and removal of obstructions are necessary for
continued airport operations. There is no special benefit to residents and community users
from the use of zoning to accomplish these ends, as opposed to the purchase of an aviation
easement.
96
Sax II, supra note 20, at 164. See also text' accompanying note 36 supra.
97
Sax II, supra note 20, at 161.
98
/d. at 171.
99
Id. at 171-72.
100
See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 71 I, 716 (Me. 1970), and text accompanying note 33
supra.
101
CJ. Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963)
(discussing the difference between building height regulation and airport hazard zoning):
We beJieve there is a distinction between the commonly accepted and traditional
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In terms of the Ackerman distinction 102 the rights of property
development are not conferred upon the public, but instead they
are destroyed by the legislative imposition of noise compatibility
regulations. In airport hazard zoning, the airspace into which a
landowner is not permitted to build is used by low-flying aircraft or
airport navigational aids. In airport noise-compatibility zoning,
however, there is no flight through the affected property, nor is any
other physical use made of the property by the airport. Therefore,
the Ackerman rationale would permit airport noise-compatibility
zoning as a legitimate exercise of the police power, because the
development rights lost through zoning are not used by the public.
Property rights, however, include not oniy ownership and possession, but the right to use, enjoyment, and disposal as well. 103
Noise-compatibility zoning, by restricting development, transfers
to the airport operator control of the right to determine whether the
regulated property will be free from adverse noise impact. Therefore, it may be argued that the Jarid use controls confer dominion
over the property on the public, and that under Ackerman this
transfer of control must be accompanied by compensation. 104 According to this analysis, the property right transferred is similar to a
noise easement, the right to exclude particular unwanted interference with one's property . 105 The ability to exclude, however, is a
necessary feature of all property rights.1° 6 Limiting the right to
height restriction zoning regulation of buildings and zoning of airport approaches in
that the latter contemplates the actual use of the airspace zoned, by aircraft,
whereas in the building cases there is no invasion or trespass to the area above the
restricted zone.
Id. at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320. See also Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d
845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1%9); Indiana Toll Road Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193
N.E.2d 237 (1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
102 See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
103
Spann v. City of Dallas, Ill Tex. 350,355,235 S.W. 513,514 (1921).
10 • Cf. Leet v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 606, 287 A.2d 491 (1972). In Leet, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the County, in requiring a property owner to remove at
his own expense automobiles abandoned on his property by trespassers, caused the property owner to spend his resources pro bono publico, and therefore effected a taking without
just compensation. Id. at 613-16, 287 A.2d at 496-97 {citing Ackerman for the distinction
between destruction of property rights and transference). The court explicitly noted that
such action was not a direct taking of private property for the public good, Id. at 613, 287
A.2d at 496, but that it did "compel the private party to use its funds and resources to confer
a benefit on the public." Id. at 616, 287 A.2d at 497.
10
• The owner may, of course, choose to sell or rent this right to exclude unwanted
interference, and the government may acquire it for a public purpose through eminent
domain proceedings.
10
• See. e.g .. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50 {2d ed. 1976). To illustrate, airport noise-compatibility zoning transfers to a public
agency the decision whether or not a particular piece of property will be impacted by airport
noise. On the one hand, the public agency has the right to reduce or eliminate the noise in
return for compensation by the property owner. On the other hand, in the absence of
noise-compatibility zoning, the public agency must purchase from the property owner the
right to subject the land to the impact of noise; i.e., a noise easement. See Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 6;4 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964). Therefore, the existence of such zoning
transfers to the public agency the property rjght represente'd by the noise 'easement.
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exclude must necessarily restrict use, enjoyment, and disposal of
the property. If compensation is called for in such cases, the
Ackerman distinction between destruction and transfer of property
rights is incorrect, and that basis for invalidating airport hazard
zoning acts must be rejected . 107
As distinguished from airport hazard zoning above, zoning for
noise-compatible development near airports should not be considered a "taking." The institutional framework for implementing
noise-compatibility programs may, however, strongly influence a
court's disposition of the constitutional challenge. In particular,
noise-compatibilty policies, such as partial compensation, in order
to reduce inequitable results 108 will affect a court's review under
the "spillover" test, 109 and under the "reciprocity of benefits"
test. 110
II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Effective land use management must combine coordination of
local planning with responsiveness to the needs of individual communities .111 The primary objectives to be balanced in managing
noise-compatible development are reducing jurisdictional fragmentation, 112 limiting program costs, and maintaining local support. 113

107
Sax I, supra note 24. at 39, identifies the reliance of the destruction-transfer theory on
limited definitions of "taking" and "property." See note 58 supra. While a qualitative
difference between destruction and transfer may have been observable during the late
1800's, when Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), see note 58 supra, was decided, the
impact of the police power through zoning, business regulation, and conservation legislation
on private ownership has eroded this distinction. Sax I, supra note 24, at 39-40.
• 0 • See note 95 supra, suggesting tax abatement as one procedure for cushioning the
impact of noise-compatibility zoning.
0
• • See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
110
See text accompanying note 100 supra.
111 Finney, The Intergovernmental Context of Local Planning, 29-32, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING (W. Goodman & E. Freund 4th ed. 1968).
112 Jurisdictional fragmentation occurs when the authority to govern a region is apportioned among a number of political agencies with either divided or overlapping jurisdiction. See generally 4 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SueSTATE REGIONALISM AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 63-67 (1974) [series hereinafter cited as
ACIR].
113 For example, in assessing the institutional framework for a national approach to
airport and aircraft noise abatement, including source, operational, and receiver components, the EPA concluded that the following factors should be fully considered: reglllatory•
responsibility over various aspects of the problem should be clearly defined and continued, a
clear definition of compensability should be developed, and the costs should ultimately be
allocated to air transportation users and beneficiaries. To enforce such regulations the
institutional framework should provide for coordination on a national level, yet allow
flexibility to meet local and regional conditions. The regulations should provide guidance for
land management, aircraft design, research and development for noise abatement technology and procedures, and for the establishment of incentives for all parties to maximize noise
reduction. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note I. at 3-13.
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Accordingly, the decision as to which level of government will be
given airport land use authority is crucial. There are three alternatives with respect to where the authority may be located: the
municipal level, the county level, and the regional level.
A. The Municipal Level

A possible locus for noise-compatibility authority is the municipal level. 114 Implementation of noise-compatibility controls might
occur under the authority of either a comprehensive community
zoning act or an airport hazard zoning act. 115 State comprehensive
co~munity zoning enabling acts generally follow 116 the format of
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. 11 7 Such acts empower
municipalities to regulate use, density, and construction upon
property for the public welfare. 118 Regulation is limited to actions
which conform to a comprehensive plan, and which further traditional police power objectives . 119 Noise-compatibility zoning is
directed toward the promotion of health and welfare goals that are
within the ambit of the police power. 120 Therefore, .assuming that
airport noise-compatibility zoning is not a "taking," 121 such land
use controls may legally be implemented under the authority of
comprehensive community zoning legislation.
Alternatively, it may be possible to zone for noise-compatible
development under the authority of an airport hazard zoning act. 122
Authority granted to local governments under airport hazard zoning acts is limited to regulation for the purpose of preventing "the
creation or establishment of airport hazards." 123 Zoning for the
114 This operation is well suited to the use of preexisting comprehensive community
zoning statutes as the legislative vehicle for noise-compatibility zoning. See text accompanying notes 129-30 infra.
115
See Part I A supra. For example of an airport hazard zoning act, see the Airport
Zoning Act in 3 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE§ 26-7 (3d ed. 1967).
116 See generally I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.21 (2d ed. 1976).
117 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926), reprinted in 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 26.01 (1968).
118
Id. at § I of the Act.
119
The Act states:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and
other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light
and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of
population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewage,
schools, parks, and other public requirements.
Id. at § 3.
120 See, e.g., Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294-95, 243 Cal. App.
2d 126, 130 (1960); Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710, 712, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 600, fl03 (1967).
121
See Part I B supra.
122
See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
123
Airport Zoning Act, § 2(b), cited in 3 E. YOKLEY, supra note 100. at § 26-7.
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purpose of promoting noise-compatible development may be
within the mandate of the statute if incompatible development is
considered.an "airport hazard." The FAA 124 has defined "airport
hazard" to include "any structure or object of natural growth
located on or in the vicinity of a public airport" which is "hazardous to such landing or taking off of aircraft." 125 Many states have
similar definitions. 126 To find that noise-compatibility controls are
within the authority of an airport hazard zoning act requires proof
that incompatible development is hazardous to aircraft landing or
taking off at public airports. Since the operational procedures that
are used to minimize noise impact result in a higher level of risk to
aircraft, 127 noise-incompatible development may represent a
hazard to aircraft. It is generally recognized, however, that the
purpose of airport hazard zoning acts is prevention of physical
hazards to aircraft, for example, building height. 128 While compatibility controls may be brought within the literal terms of the
acts, they may not be within the puposes of such legislation.
Local governments will likely favor noise-compatibility authority at the municipal level, whether through the means of comprehensive community zoning or airport hazard zoning.
Municipalities already exercise the power to regulate property, 129
and officials of these communities generally favor retaining this
124
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, MODEL AIRPORT HAZARD ZONING ORDINANCE, ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC: 150/5190-3A. Appeidix I (1972).
125 Id. at Appendix I, § 11(3).
126
ALA. CODE tit. 4, § 63(3) (1958); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 2-321(3) (West Supp. 1976);
CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 41-3-103(3) (1973); DEL. CoDE tit. 2, § 102(10) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 333.01(3) (Supp. 1976); HAW~ REv. STAT. § 262-1(2) (1968); IDAHO CODE§ 21-501(2)
(Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15-½, § 48.3 (1973); IowA CODE§ 329.1(2) (1975); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.011(8) (Supp. 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.601(6) (1973); MD.
ANN. CoDE art. IA,§ 1-110 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 35(g) (1975); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 360.013(22) (1966); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 61-7-3(2) (1973); Mo. REv. STAT. §
305.505(2) (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-102(21) (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV.
STAT.§ 3-101(22) (1974); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 497.020(2) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN;§
424:1(11) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 63-1(9) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 2-04-01(2) (1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4563.01(B) (Page 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 65.l(c) (1973);
OR. REv. STAT.§ 492.010(8) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1551(2) (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 1-3-2(2) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 42-401(2) (1964); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 2-4-1(2) (1971);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 552 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE§ 14.12.010(2) (1974); w. VA. CODE§
29-2A-l(h) (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 114.002(1 I) (1974).
127
For example, a two-segment aircraft landing approach pattern will reduce noise impact
across portions of the approach pattern. The procedure involves use of a steeper glide path
during the early stages of approach (5 to 6°), followed by return to a normal glide slope (3°)
for final approach and touchdown. An inherent safety problem in this procedure -is the.
impact of aircraft wake, vortices on aircraft flying a 3° approach behind aircraft using a
two-segment approach. AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY, supra note I, at 45.
128
See, e.g., Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 567, 394 P.2d 641, 646 (1964);
Peacock v. City of Sacrdmento. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 857-58, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391, 402-03
(1969). See Part I A supra.
129
I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 2.29 (2d ed. 1976).
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power. 13 ° Furthermore, locating airport land use power at the focal
level permits the use of existing land development and planning
agencies, thereby minimizing the costs of a compatibility program.131
A fundamental cause of incompatible development a;ound airports, however, has been the fragmentation of land use authority
around airports. 132 This is exacerbated when the locus of regulatory power is the municipai ievei. The demand for residential
development generated by the gro.wth of the airport itself has
induced neighboring cities to zone for incompatible residential
uses. 133 An additional incentive for incompatible development 1s
130

See note 147 infra. See also 4 ACIR, supra note 112, at 65.
4 ACIR, supra note 112, at 63.
132
CALIFORNIA STATE SEN. COMM. ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, BACKGROUND REPORT: A
REVIEW OF AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSIONS (Nov. 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
BACKGROUND REPORT]: "One of the major barriers to an effective method for controlling
incompatible uses around airports is the fragmented land use authority which often exists
around airports. One jurisdiction owns the airport, several others may regulate land uses
while still others may provide public improvements." Id. at 8. For example, Los Angeles
International Airport is owned and operated by the City of Los Angeles. Land use around
the airport is under the jurisdiction of the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles,
the City of El Segundo, the City of Hawthorne, and the City of Inglewood. LAND USE
CONTROL STRATEGIES, supra note 91, at 59. Coordination of an airport noise policy for the
entire impact area has been difficult to achieve. Id. at 72.
133
Total employment at a new airport could range as high as 39,300 people. Berger,
Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S. CALL. REV. 631,676 (i970). In addition, three basic types
of commercial and industrial activities contribute to employment opportunities in the area:
airport-dependent activities whose level of business is directly related to airport passenger
volume; airport-related activities whose business is a direct function of airport operations;
and airport-attracted activities which prefer easy access to the airport. LAND UsE CONTROL
STRATEGIES, supra note 91, at 25-26. Accordingly, the very presence of an airport initially
creates a demand for local housing. Berger, 43 S. CAL. L. REv., at 668. To this extent,
neighboring cities have an economic incentive to zone for residential development. An
additional incentive is that property tax revenues will increase. Blitch, supra note 15, at
701-02. The physical impacts of an airport. however, which are largely undesirable, almost
exclusively affect nearby residences and activities. The economic benefits of the airport are
distributed throughout the entire region served by the airport. LAND UsE CONTROL
STRATEGIES, supra note 91, at 8. In most cases continuing airport and aviation expansion
increases the potential for severe noise impact. Id. at 9.
Residents of neighborhoods adjacent to an airport fear that these impacts are
translated into negative economic impacts that they must bear. Homeowners fear
that airport noise pollution and safety hazards diminish the value of their homes.
This argument is hard to document because any possible economic losses are
masked by generally rising metropolitan real estate values and a variety of local
real estate market factors. In fact, in some cases the presence of the airport may
increase residential values, but most airport-area residents are convinced that their
homes will sell for less and would be harder to sell than similar homes elsewhere.
Airport neighbors who are anxious to move away from the inconveniences of the
airport area believe that they are locked into their present homes because they may
be unable to realize enough on the sale of their home to acquire acceptable housing
elsewhere.
Id. at 9. A case study of Los Angeles has indicated that selling a residence near an airport is
extremely difficult. Id. at 62. In most cases, the potential resale value for industrial and
commercial use may not be sufficient to compensate for the cost of residential land when the
value of the houses, which must be removed, is considered. Id. at 3. Additionally, persons
feel a strong attachment to old neighborhoods and may be unwilling to move despite severe
noise impact. Berger, 43 S. CAL. L. REV., at 669. Therefore, neighborhoods may be
expected to deteriorate over time into noise-induced ghettos. See text accompanying note 78
supra.
131

SPRING

Airport Noise Compatibility

1977]

465

the potential for an expanded municipal tax base. 134 Despite the
local interest in controlling land use around airports and the lower
administrative costs that may be realized by using local agencies to
implement noise-compatibility regulation, the need to increase policy coordination requires that noise-compatibility regulation be
vested at a higher level of government. 135
B. The County Level

An alternative locus for noise-compatibility zoning authority is
the county level. Involving multijurisdictional administrative units
of the state, 136 regulation at this level would reduce the fragmentation of land use authority. Furthermore, since land use planning
agencies may already exist at the county level, 137 use of existing
agencies may also involve fiscal savings. 138 In California, for example, a system of county-level Airport Land Use Commissions
(ALUC's) has been established to achieve compatible new development by zoning. 139 The ALUC's are authorized to formulate
comprehensive land use plans for areas surrounding airports, and
are empowered to disapprove the decisions of local agencies that
are inconsistent with such plans . 140 The power to disapprove inconsistent development plans is qualified by a provision for an
override by a four-fifths vote of the governing body of the local
agency . 141 This approach has provided flexibility in adapting the
broad noise-compatibility plan to local needs. 142 In California,
counties have designated existing agencies to act as the ALUC or
have authorized new organizations to handle ALUC responsibilities.143 Four counties have designated the Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission as their ALUC. The Planning
Commission is trans-county in jurisdiction, and has been designated as the ALUC in four out of six counties. 144
The California ALUC system has a number of drawbacks. Established agencies, already burdened with a variety of planning
problems, have viewed airport noise compatibility planning as a
.
134

.

Blitch, supra note 15, at 701-02.
AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 161.
136 3 ACIR, supra note 112, at 54.
137
Id. at 63-64, & Table IV-10.
138 See text accompanying note 131 supra.
139 CAL. Pue. UTIL. CODE § 21674(5) (Supp. 1975).
140
Id. at §§ 21675, 21676.
141
Id. at § 21676.
142 See H. DUNNING, AN INVESTIGATIVE STUDY OF THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE IN
AIRPORT NOISE REGULATION 57-58 (final report to the EPA 1975).
1 3
• Id. at 57.
144 Id. at 57-58.
135
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low priority issue, 145 while new agencies have encountered problems of funding and political recognition. 146 For example, much of
the conflict over development near metropolitan airports in
California has been attributed to the question of local control
versus ALUC control. 147 Such conflicts result from the division of
jurisdiction over land development, the failure of municipalities to
c:onc:ern
--------- themselves
- -- with ::ire::i-wide
-- -.nrohlems_
. .
-~ ::ind the limits ...nlaced
upon ALUC power by the override provisions. 148 In evaluating the
desirability of locating airport land use authority at the county
level, however, the ability of a county-level agency to reguce
jurisdictional fragmentation must be weighed against the conflicts_
engendered by intrusion into areas of traditionally local concerns.
;-------

---

-

C. The Regional Level

Finally, authority to administer noise-compatibility zoning may
be vested in a regional agency. Because the environmental and
economic impact of an airport is area-wide in scope, a comprehensive regional approach may be required. 149 An institutional structure based at the regional level may be able to coordinate airport
development with other modes of transportation, as well as other
uses and activities which compete for the same resources . 150 In
Minneapolis-St. Paul, for example, airport development is reId. at 58.
Id. See Blitch, supra note 15, at 678, for a discussion of the problems of Alameda
County ALUC (a new organization) encountered in dealing with the City of Alameda.
147 One such conflict is between the Port of Oakland, the City of Alameda, and the
Alameda County ALUC over a proposed residential development near Metropolitan Oakland International Airport. See generally Blitch, supra note 15, and H. DUNNING, supra
note 142, at 74-86. The Airport, under the jurisdiction of the Board of Port Commissioners of
the City of Oakland, lies on Bay Fm-m Island, immediately adjacent to a portion of the island
within the City of Alameda. H. DUNNING, supra note 142, at 75. In 1973, Alameda rezoned a
portion of the island for single-family residences, which is the most difficult form of housing
to insulate against sound. Blitch, supra note 15, at 674-75. Following this rezoning, the
Alameda County ALUC conducted hearings upon the proposed development of the noiseimpacted land, and disapproved the rezoning as inconsistent with the best interests of the
area. H. DUNNING, supra note 142, at 86. The Alameda City Council unanimously overruled
the ALUC determination and reinstituted single-family zoning for the site. Id. "[T]he key
issue for the city council was local control. Faced with another government body taking
significant action on land use matters the city regards as within its exclusive jurisdiction, the
city council was unwilling to agree to any compromise." Id.
Four court actions have arisen out of this conflict. City of Oakland v. City of Alameda,
Alameda County Sup. Ct. No. 453290-3 (memorandum opinion and announcement of
intended decision filed Aug. 13, 1975); City of Oakland v. City of Alameda, Alameda County
Sup. Ct. No. 450083-0 (judgment filed Mar. 11, 1975); City of Alameda v. City of Oakland,
San Francisco County Sup. Ct. No. 687-726 (judgment entered Apr. 6, 1976); City of
Alameda v. City of Oakland, San Francisco County Sup. Ct. No. 694-559 (filed Aug. 26,
1975).
.
148
Blitch, supra note 15, at 704-05.
149
AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 162.
150
Such resources may include water supply, utility services, and air pollution control
facilities. Id.
145

146
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gionally based. 151 Policy direction is provided by the Metropolitan
Council, while operational control is vested in the Metropolitan
Airport Commission. 152 One consequence of this separation of
planning and implementation was continuing conflict over the site
of a new major airport in the area. 153
The most significant problems with locating airport land use
authority at either the county or regional level are that it will
intrude into areas of previously local concern, 154 and that it may
require the creation of a new agency, thereby proliferating the
number of government bodies. 155 Additionally, specific state legislative authorization for an airport noise-compatibility program
would be necessary. Such authorization permits the establishment
of a program to meet the requirements of the immediate problem 156
and allows statewide concerns to be expressed through the legislative process. Accordingly, the impact of local interests will be
reduced 157 and the prospects for a comprehensive approach to
noise-compatible land use will be enhanced. 158 Since local objections to these developments would create practical problems in

151
The Minnesota state legislature adopted the regional approach while restructuring the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area local government. 1967 MINN. LAWS ch. 896, as amended, 1974
MINN. LAWS ch. 422 and 1975 MINN. LAWS ch. 13. See also 2 ACIR, supra note I 12, at I 16.
A Metropolitan Council with policymaking duties was established.§ 2, 1967 MINN. LAWS
ch. 896. The Council is now provided with metropolitan planning authority. MINN. STAT.
ANN.§§ 473.145-.151 (Supp. 1976), including airport planning. Id. at§§ 473.215-.219. The
Council was not, however, granted operational control over the independent metropolitan
commissions, including the Metropolitan Airport Commission. 2 ACIR, supra note 112, at
125-26.
152
See note 151 supra. This arrangement for implementing policy, known as the "Sewer
Board Model," involves a regional Commission legally separate, but subordinate to, the
Council. The Commission owns the facilities and is charged with carrying out the program. 2
ACIR, supra note 112, at 125-26.
153
During the period 1968-70, the Council vetoed a MAC proposal for a new airport site. 2
ACIR, supra note 112, at 121. Although the staffs of the two agencies jointly reexamined the
proposal, which was then resubmitted by MAC, the Council again vetoed the suggested site.
Id. In early 1973, the Council prepared an airport system plan and directed MAC to
"search" a specified new site. Id. at 124. This stalemate resulted from the failure of the State
legislature to direct that MAC follow Council guidelines, while providing the Council with
power to suspend MAC development programs. Id. at 126.
154
Cf note 147 (discussing the problem of local control versus county-level authority; the
same considerations are relevant to regional-level authority).
155
See note 18 supra.
156
See text accompanying notes 142-44 supra.
157
See BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 132, at 8-9.
158
The U.S. Department of Transportation argues that a
comprehensive and regional approach is essential for effective land use planning
and control in the airport environs .... Multijurisdictional and local interests in Che
airport environs which have prevented, for example, zoning measures for guiding
compatible development can be overridden. Zoning powers exercised by a higher
government level (i.e., area-wide agency or county) are more effective in this
regard than local municipal efforts to date.
AIRPORTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 161. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency described the California approach as "advanced and systematic," and
the ALUC provisions as "a comprehensive procedure to obtain compatible land use."
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 2-41. 2-50.
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administering a noise-compatibility program, 159 a possible solution
to this problem is the separation of the planning, implementation,
and enforcement functions of land use control as a means of satisfying local concerns. Proposed amendments to the California
ALUC provisions 160 would remove zoning authority from ALUC's
and would provide instead a coordination and oversight role. 161
ALUC's would retain the right to review and to veto community
land use decisions, subject to an override power given to the local
agency . 162 The local decisions, however, would have to conform to
an airport noise and safety compatibility plan prepared by the
ALUC. 163 While county and regional approaches would appear to
be the more efficient means of meeting the goals of a noisecompatibility program, accommodations such as those contained
in the California proposals may be necessary to avoid the opposition of local governments . 164

Ill.

ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

Enforcement procedures for noise-compatibility programs present two issues: first, whether there is a need for special enforcement; and second, assuming an enforcement mechanism is necessary, what form it should take. 165 The special problems of enforcing noise-compatibility zoning regulations stem from the interjurisdictional nature of airport land use planning. There are economic incentives, such as expansion of the tax base, for communities to allow the growth of incompatible development. 166 Additionally, real estate speculators may withhold property from the
market in order to cause a change in zoning laws, thereby diminishing the supply of available land, and increasing the market value of
remaining property. 167 The most efficient uses for expensive land
159
16

See note 132 supra.

° California Senate Bill S. 1995 (Mar. 23, 1976), as amended in the Senate (May 4, 1976)

(introduced by State Senator Anthony Beilenson) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 1995].
161
Id. at § 4.
162
Id. at § 6.
163
See id., at § 5.
164 The conflict between the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council and MAC, where
planning and implementation are separated, however, has led to a stalemate. See note 153
supra.
165 rhe Environmental Protection Agency considers one of the basic criteria for an
administrative framework for airport and aircraft noise regulation to be that "[t]he institutions assigned the responsibility of developing and adopting noise regulations must have
both the legal and practical power, and adequate resources to enforce such regulations."
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 3-10.
166 See note 133 supra. Even if land use authority is located at a regional or county level,
coordination of building codes, tax policies, and public development is still necessary.
167
LAND USE CONTROL STRATEGIES, supra note 91, at 29.
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are high-density residential or commercial development, neither of
which are noise-compatible. 168 Moreover, if some jurisdictions
reduce the available land supply for noise-incompatible uses
through zoning, property values in jurisdictions without noisecompatibility regulations will increase. As a result, noisecompatible development will not be uniform, and municipal competition for enlarged tax bases will be intensified . 169 Therefore, it is
necessary to develop an enforcement system to ensure that the
costs of a compatibility program are distributed equitably among
all jurisdictions.
One means of enforcing policies is through "action-forcing devices," administrative requirements designed to ensure that decision-makers consider certain factors prior to a decision. 170 The
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 171 the most
prominent example of this form of enforcement, 172 requires _federal
agencies to prepare a detailed statement of the projected environmental impact for all "major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." 173 During the process of
preparing the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), agencies
must consider alternative actions and consult with other agencies
having environmental expertise. 174
The most fundamental impact of NEPA as an "action-forcing"
device may be the information that it provides the public about
agency decisions. The information contained in the EIS's has provided citizens and organizations with a basis for legal challenges to
individual projects.11 5 The threat of legal action has not only been
felt in those cases, but has "forced" consideration of environmental issues in many other projects as well. 176
168

Id. at 20, 29.
See note 133 supra.
170
Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and/nsular
Affairs, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. 112-35 (1969) (testimony of Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell). See also
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 n. 13 (5th Cir.
1974).
171
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, (codified at 42 U .S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
172
Other examples include the Inflationary Impact Statements mandated by Exec. Order
No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,502 (1974); State Environmental Policy, 1973 MINN. LAWS ch.
412, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ I 16D.01-.07 (Supp. 1977); Governmental Consideration of
Environmental Impact, 1971 Wis. LAWS ch. 274, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (Supp. 1976). As
of April 1976, 26 states have adopted environmental action-forcing requirements of their
own. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 135 (1976) [series
hereinafter cited as CEQ].
173
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § l02(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
169

11•Jd.
175

7 CEQ, supra note 172, at 122-32; Andrews,Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 315-17 (1976).
176
3 CEQ, supra note 172, at 226-27 (1962); 6 CEQ, supra note 172, at 628 (1975). But see
Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental Policy Act
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The use of "action-forcing" measures has also been proposed
with respect to airport land use decisions. Proposed amendments
to the California ALUC provisions, 177 for example, would require that a local agency overriding an ALUC decision to veto a
development project "make specific findings demonstrating that
the proposed action is consistent with the purposes" of the Act. 178
By compe!!ing consideration of noise-compatibility in development
plans and providing a basis for judicial review of land use decisions, these "findings" would function in a manner similar to an
EIS. The courts would become the forum for requiring that the
"findings" be consistent with an airport noise and safety compatibility plan prep;ired by the ALUC.17 9
.
By requiring a local agency to make "findings" only when overriding an ALUC veto of a local decision, the proposed California
amendments place the "action-forcing" device at the end of the
decision-making process. If the goal of such a mechanism is to
force consideration of noise-compatibility concerns, this purpose
may be served more effectively by requiring that the "findings of
consistency'' be made at the time of local government approval of
the development plan. Forcing the original approval to be accompanied by a "finding of consistency" would provide incentives for
developers, local land use agencies, and local legislative bodies to
modify proposals sooner in order to accommodate noise impact
concerns. Significantly, conditioning the initial approval of a development plan upon its conformity with noise-compatibility goals
should bring such concerns to the attention of the developer at a
stage where modification is still economically feasible. 18° Furtherof 1969, 16 NAT. REsoVRCES J. 323, 323-24 (1974): "Federal agency implementation of
NEPA and response to the requirement in Section 102(2)(c) for environmental impact
statement (EIS), has been reluctant and incomplete."
177 S.B. 1995, supra note 160.
178 Id. at § 6(1)
179
See id. at§ 5. "Findings" by an administrative agency may be adjudged by a court as
inadequate where they reveal a failure to make a full consideration of the problem as
intended by the authorizing statute. See Lindberg v. Zoning Bd. of Appeats, 8 Ill. 2d 254,133
N.E.2d 266 (1956).
Citizen enforcement might take the form of mandamus proceedings, in which either the
local government body, or the ALUC, would be compelled to measure the proposed
development against the airport noise and safety compatibility plan. S.B, 195, § 5. Mandamus is available either to '' compel performance of a ministerial act which the law specially
enjoins .... ," see, e.g., CAL. CODE. C1v. PRoc. § 1085 (1970), " ... or to inquire into the
validity of some kinds of quasi-judicial actions of administrative agencies .... " See, e.g.,
CAL. CODE. C1v. PRoc. § 1094.5 (1970). Gong v. City of Fremont, 250 Cal. App. 2d 568, 58
Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1%7). A writ of mandamus is issued at the discretion of the court.
Kartheiser v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 2d 617, 622, 345 P.2d 135, 139 (1959). Alternatively, individual citizens might bring an action under the provisions of a "liberal standing:
to-sue" statute. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22a-16 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§ 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1976).
18
° Cf. Calverts Cliffs Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (O.C. Cir. 1971), where the
court invalidated the AEC's NEPA implementation regulations. The regulations delayed the
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more, the ''findings" prepared by the local body will provide
detailed information to the public at an earlier time and allow
citizen enforcement of the adequacy of the findings. 181
There are several problems which have been raised in connection with "action forcing" procedures, and, in particular, NEPA.
The content and scope of the material which must be included in
the "findings" requires the issuance of administrative guidelines
and criteria, 182 and compliance with these guidelines delays the
project to some ex tent, with accompanying increases in costs. 183
Requiring "findings" may also lead to abuse of the process of
jndicial review. In order to thwart development plans, parties may
file unfounded suits designed solely to delay or to increase the
costs of the proposed development. 184
An alternate approach to enforcing a noise-compatibility program would be to condition state financial assistance upon a showing of substantial action to promote compatible development. 185
While the imposition of zoning on a local level may not require
outside funding, a noise-compatibility program encompassing
property acquisition, property regulation, and enforcement of
building and housing codes would require funding beyond the
capacity of individual municipalities. 186 The Federal government,
for example, has used this approach in providing grants for airport
development pursuant to the terms of the Airport and Airways

writing of an EIS for nuclear power plants until application was made for an operating
license. "By refusing to consider the requirement of alternatives until construction. is
completed, the Commission may effectively foreclose the environmental protection desired
by Congress .... If 'irreversible and irretrievable commitment[s] of resources' have already
been made, the license hearing (and any public intervention therein) may become a hollow
exercise." Id. at I 128.
181
See note 179 supra.
182
See generally CEQ Guidelines: Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40
C.F.R. Part 1500 (1975), and proposed FAA Order 1050.18, Policies and Procedures for
Considering Environmental Impacts, 41 Fed. Reg. 34222-34238 (Aug. 12, 1976). For a
description of the CEQ guidelines, see Deutsch, The National Environmental Policy Act's
Firs( Five Years, 4 ENV. AFF. 3, 13- I 8 (I 975). The guidelines consider the types of actions
covered under the Act, 40 C.F.R. Part 1500.5, the content of EIS's, id. at Part 1500.8,
procedures for review and comment, id. at Part 1500.9, and the effect of NEPA on existing
agency mandates. Id. at Part 1500.4.
183
Cortner, supra note 176, at 324-25 (1976). See also Calverts Cliff's Coord. Comm. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d I 109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
.
184
Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and
Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 258-59 (1976). See also Comment, Four Years of
Environmental Impact Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON
L. REV. 545, 565-66 (1973).
185
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY' supra note 28, at 25-26, 47-49.
186
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note I' at 4-12 to 4-13. For example, Los
Angeles International Airport has spent $136 million acquiring noise-impacted land, and has
paid an additional $20 million in damages to noise-impacted schools. BACKGROUND REPORT,
supra note 132, at 3. The airport has spent an average of $200,000 per acre purchased, and
redevelopment is not expected to cover the expenses. LAND UsE STRATEGIES, supra note
91, at 51.

472

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:447

Development Act. 187 Prior to approving an airport development
grant, the Secretary of Transportation must receive assurance that
"appropriate action, including the passage of zoning laws," is
taken "to the extent reasonable," to limit development of airport
environs to airport-compatible uses . 188 The Airport and Airways
Development Act is directed, however, at the airport proprietor
and is only indirectly applicable to local land use agencies. 189 In
addition, the indefinite language of the Act, "to the extent reasonable," undercuts strong enforcement efforts by either the Department of Transportation or citizen groups. 19 ° Conditioning noisecompatibility funding by state government to land use agencies
upon a showing of substantial action may be a more effective
means of promoting such a policy.
Conditional assistance legislation with clear restrictions, directed at the responsible actor, would have an immediate impact
by providing a financial incentive for implementing noisecompatibility objectives. 191 Two major assumptions would be inherent in a conditional assistance program. The first is that airport
noise-compatibility is an important goal of the land use agency.
The second is that the fiscal and nonfiscal costs of conforming a
program to state or federal dictates do not outweigh the benefits of
outside funding. Local governments, however, may wish to
maximize their tax revenue base by developing property to its
highest economic potential. 192 The demand for residential development is a basic short-run factor operating against a noisecompatibility program. 193 Imposing the additional burden of compliance with state or federal direction may be an unacceptable
interference in local affairs, causing the agency's refusal to accept
the conditional funding.
Noise-compatibility policies may also be effectuated by means of
a two-tiered implementation and enforcement procedure. Under
this approach local land use agencies would have primary r~spon-

187 Under the terms of the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-258, 84 Stat. 229, as amended by Airports and Airways Development Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-353, 90 Stat. 871 (1976) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)), the federal government is authorized to make planning and airport development grants. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1714 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The 1976 Amendments
authorize grants for the purchase of noise suppression equipment, the construction of
physical barriers, landscaping to diminish the effect of aircraft noise, and the purchase of
property rights to insure noise-compatible development. Pub. L. No. 94-353, at § 3(a)(I).
188 49 U.S.C. § 1718(4) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
189 See City oflnglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948,956 (9th Cir. 1971), where
the court refused to rule whether a neighboring community had the right to sue an airport ·
proprietor for failure to meet the conditions of§ 1718(4). See also text accompanying note
171 supra.
•• 0 451 F.2d at 954-56.
191
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY, supra note 28, at 47.
192 See note 133 sup,:a.
193
/d.
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sibility for operating a noise-compatibility program. The state
would establish standards for the program and would formulate
individual compatibility plans if local agencies fail to meet the
standards. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 194 illustrate this
approach. Under the 1970 Amendments, individual states are required to adopt and to submit to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency implementation plans for national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. 195 If the state
fails to submit an implementation plan, submits an inadequate plan,
or fails to make a required revision, the Administrator will promulgate an implementation plan for the recalcitrant state. 196
The California ALUC system involves a two-tiered approach.
Primary responsibility for noise-compatible development lies with
local government, but it must conform with standards set by the
county-level ALUC in a comprehensive land use plan. 197 Unlike
the Clean Air Act Amendments, compliance with ALUC standards
may be overridden by a four-fifths vote of the local agency . 198
Removing the override provision would provide a mechanism for
state guidance of local airport land use policy decisions. 199
A necessary feature of the two-tiered system is the existence of
standards against which local efforts may be measured. 200 Ad hoc
decisions as to the adequacy oflocal land use programs would have
little deterrent effect upon incompatible development and would
not provide guidance to individual communities regarding acceptable land use planning. 201 This difficulty would be met by the formulation of an "airport noise and safety plan" as suggested in the
proposed California ALUC amendments. 202
194
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
195 Id. at§ IIO(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(I) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
196
Id.at § l lO(c)(I), 42 U .S.C. § 1857c-5(c)(I) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
197
CAL. Pua. UTIL. CODE § 21675 (Supp. 1975).
198
Blitch, supra note 15, at 678-79. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421
U.S. 60 (1975), for a history of the federal role in supervision of air pollution standards.
The difference under the Amendments was that States were no longer given any
choice as to whether they would meet this responsibility [to reduce air pollution].
For the first time they were required to attain air quality of specified standards, and
to do so within a specified period of time.
Id. at 64-65.
199
Blitch, supra note 15, at 679.
20
° Cf. National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. Part
50 (1976), and Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans, 40 C.F.R. Part 51 (1976) (guidelines for two-tiered implementation structure).
201
An excellent basic document for airport noise-compatibility planning standards is
AIRCRAFT NoISE IMPACT, supra note 19. EPA recommends, as part of its proposal to
reduce airport noise, that the planning guidelines in AIRCRAFT NOISE IMPACT be used to
judge noise-compatibility around airports. AIRPORT REGULATORY PROCESS, supra note 7, at
51,526.
202
S.B. 1995, § 5, supra note 160. According to the BACKGROUND REPORT accompanying
S.B. 1995, the "airport noise and safety plan" would define noise impact and crash hazard
areas, and indicate compatible uses under state-established guidelines. BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 132, at 8. See generally AIRCRAFT NOISE IMPACT, supra note 16, and the
EPA endorsement of the planning guidelines contained therein, supra note 19.
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The two-tiered enforcement model also appears to provide disincentives to local efforts to promote noise-compatible development.
State government would be required to step in when local agencies
fail to meet the standards. Therefore, local refusal to provide a
noise-compatibility program would result in transferring the costs
of administering the program to the state level. 203 Additionally, in
order to maintain the capability for land use planning on the state
level if the local agency defaults, a duplication of planning resources would be necessary. In order to remove the cost incentives
for local government noncompliance, a device for assessing the
defaulting local community for the costs of state formulation of a
compatibility plan is essential to effective enforcement through a
two-tiered model. 204

IV.

CONCLUSION

An essential element of an effective airport noise-compatibility
development program is noise-compatibility zoning. While airport
hazard zoning has often been successfully challenged on fifth
amendment grounds ·as a "taking" of private property for public
use without just compensation, airport noise-compatibility zoning
is distinguishable upon two grounds. First, the size of the class
benefitted by compatibility zoning is larger, encompassing the entire community. Second, the regulated land is not physically appropriated to the benefit of the public agency. On the basis of these
distinctions, airport noise-compatibility zoning should be sustained
in the face of a constitutional challenge.
In devising the institutional framework for a noise-compatibility
program, specific state legislative authorization provides.the ability
to tailor a program to meet the needs of the problem at hand, and
allows statewide concerns to be expressed. The adverse effects of
parochialism will be reduced correspondingly. Jurisdictional cooperation is further assisted by locating the institutional authority at
either the county or regional level of government. In addition, the
combination of a specific legislative act and a county or regionally
based loc·ation provides greater flexibility in dealing with individual
noise-impact problems.
203
The problems with New York City enforcement of air pollution controls are discussed
in Schachter, Some Criteria for Evaluating State and Local Air Pollution Control Laws. 14
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 583, 628-30 (1973).
·
204
See id. at 628: New York City will seek civil penalties along withinjunctive relief,
where air pollution violations are both serious and continuous. "The reason for seeking
penalties in addition to an injunction is to decrease the likelihood of delays in compliance."
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The proposed California ALUC amendments seek to establish
an effective method of enforcing noise-compatibility policies. A
possible improvement would be to modify the suggested "actionforcing device" so that the "findings of consistency" are reached
at the same time as initial local government approval of the development project. Requiring that "findings" be made earlier in
the decision-making process will provide a method of internalizing
noise-compatibility goals at an early stage, lower administrative
costs, and promote effective enforcement of compatibility goals as
expressed in the ALUC "noise and safety" compatibility plans.
The viability of conditional assistance as an enforcement procedure for a noise-compatible development program depends upon
the force of the conditions. Furthermore, the requirements expressed in the conditions should be met directly by the local land use
agencies, not indirectly through the airport proprietor. Finally,
separating implementation and enforcement into a two-tiered
framework may be an effective system for enforcing noisecompatibility policy. There must, however, be objective standards
included in a "noise and safety plan" against which local efforts
may be measured, and the costs of state formulation of a compatibility plan must be assessed upon a defaulting local community.
Whatever the means. chosen, however, thoughtful planning is essential to alleviate the airport noise problem.

-Mark Kantor

